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Abstract
This paper will concern itself with a formulation of a traﬃc analysis problem for mobile agents. It is
an interesting theoretical problem as well as a critical feature when using agents on a massive scale
in decision making systems. The decision making systems are applied to demanding and complex
environments such as stock markets. The mobile agents used are natural targets for attacks because
they provide information for decision making. The resulting information can have a value measured
in millions of dollars and information of such a high value attracts potential attacks. An eﬃcient
way to attack the user of decision making systems is to learn her strategy and respond in kind. In
this respect even passive observation of agents can provide useful data, namely what information
they are gathering. A common ﬁrst defense is to provide anonymity for mobile agents. However,
what happens when anonymity is gone? What information then becomes available and what steps
will the user take? Yet, the problem has not been previously formulated for such a framework.
We formulate it in terms of various factors used for traﬃc analysis. These factors originate from
diﬀerent side channels that provide information on the operating agents. At the end we state
a paradox, which links an excessive use of countermeasures against traﬃc analysis with weakening
system security.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
“Program a map to display frequency of data exchange, every thousand mega-
bytes a single pixel on a very large screen. [...] Up your scale. Each pixel
a million megabytes. At a hundred million megabytes per second, you begin to
make out certain blocks in midtown Manhattan, outlines of hundred-year-old
industrial parks ringing the old core of Atlanta.” – William Gibson in [1]
This paper is much diﬀerent from crypto papers that we usually write.
First of all, it does not contain any mathematical equations. Its main pur-
pose is to present a fascinating topic, which still eludes a precise quantitative
description. While it is no problem to present some mathematical model to
make a paper look more scientiﬁc, it is almost impossible to build a good
model for such a complex system.
1.1 Preliminaries
Mobile agents were at their peak in the late 90’s, which was closely corre-
lated with the Internet boom. Now, when the preoccupation with the agents
decreased, why it is worthy to bother with the mobile agents’ systems?
The main reason for disappointment with the mobile agent technology is,
that it failed to meet the expectations. It is true that individuals do not use
mobile agents on a massive scale, for instance to shop for the lowest airlines
fares [5]. One of the reasons was certainly the economy. But were mobile
agents a case of failed technology or too high expectations? Or maybe mobile
agents were put aside by new concepts in IT technology, e.g. grid computing?
These are topics of ongoing dispute, which are far from being resolved.
We deal with mobile agents security because of two reasons:
• they are a fascinating and challenging theoretical concept (we also have
a strong feeling that mobile agents will have their great comeback);
• there are applications for mobile agents, which are security critical.
Mobile agents beneﬁt simultaneously from remote code execution, cou-
pled with autonomy and adaptation to a changing environment. Mobile code
oﬀers a new paradigm in computing, which is well suited for increasingly
interconnected environments. This paradigm opens new opportunities, but
simultaneously creates new threats.
Mobile agents are excellent vehicles for modern decision making systems,
see [2]. In the same paper another agents’ feature is discussed: close simi-
larity to real life solutions and situations. In fact, we witness the situation
that an increasing number of concepts, characteristic to real life, migrate into
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cyberspace. This process is well visible in the ﬁeld of security protocols [3].
Mobile agents based decision making systems may be perceived as a collection
of protocols for distributed information acquisition and analysis. Reality and
cyberspace enter into a feedback.
Intelligent mobile agents are the most reﬁned form of decision systems
that we have yet created. The agent systems can be considered as not only
eﬀective, but also user-friendly information technology tools, easy to accept
by non-professional users [4].
In the modern world mobile agents are applied in the most demanding and
complex environments, for instance stock markets. The resulting information
can have a value measured in millions of dollars. When such high stakes are on
the table, they always attract potential attackers. An eﬃcient way to attack
the user of such a system is to learn her strategy and respond with one’s own.
The mobile agents are a natural target for the attack because they provide
information for decision making.
While the mobile agent technology has been created for the users’ conve-
nience and improvement in decision systems’ performance, it has introduced
new risks into the process—the decision process can now be observed and
inﬂuenced by the competitors.
This paper makes several contributions. First, we describe traﬃc analy-
sis for mobile agents. Second, we show two realms; cyber space and reality,
that business take place. The interplay between these two realms increases
complexities of design and security analysis. Third, we outline side channels,
many of which have their roots in system complexity. Finally, we state “over-
protection paradox”, namely that an excessive use of countermeasures against
traﬃc analysis weakens system security.
The purpose of this paper is to present a new source of risk. It arises
from the agent systems’ potential vulnerabilities and leads to a perceived or
acknowledged business risk that may need to be contained. As far as we
know, the problem was not investigated from such an angle. To be able
to formulate it, ﬁrst we need to provide some information on mobile agents
security. This will allow us to make security assumptions needed for a more
precise description of the problem.
1.2 Mobile Agent Security
Mobile agents security falls into a set of problems with mobile security, which
were nicely outlined by Roger Needham in [6]. In the paper he presents
the development of security methods from a historical perspective. At ﬁrst
security was designed for immobile environments, next mobile technologies
(e.g. agents) appeared and a security gap was created. Although great eﬀorts
K. Kulesza et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 181–193 183
have been made to close the gap, the major problem is in the paradigm. The
historical foundation was good as long as “nothing move[d]”, see [6]. Hence,
it is not surprising that currently mobile agents security is an active ﬁeld of
research, with many challenges still ahead, see [7,8]. The most recent survey
on mobile agents security can be found in [22].
The problems with security protocols involving mobile agents, prompted
Volker Roth to write about programming Satan’s agents [9], in the fashion
similar to Ross Anderson’s Satan’s computer [10]. Roth’s article shows the
seriousness of the situation. However, since mobile agents security is still
a young discipline, it is assumed that in time, many of the problems will be
resolved. Therefore, this paper will make two assumptions: (1) protocols used
are secure and (2) the agents outside trusted hosts do not leak any other
information than possibly about their presence.
In the agent system we have the following parties: the owner for the agents,
the mobile agents, the hosts (locations visited by the agents), the adversary.
In the security model that we consider:
• Agents can move freely between hosts;
• In public agents travel in encrypted form, the same applies to the data
acquired by the agent;
• Hosts are secure locations, which means that an adversary cannot compro-
mise a host’s security.
The paper discusses how to perform successful traﬃc analysis in such an
environment. Moreover, any eﬀort to increase a level of protection against
traﬃc analysis can result in opening windows of opportunity for some side
channel attack. Before outlining these concepts in Section 3, ﬁrst a few re-
marks about traﬃc analysis itself.
2 Traﬃc Analysis
“Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.
Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack
his army.” – Sun Zi in [11]
2.1 Remarks on Traﬃc Analysis in Security
In the networking world there are many schemes using diﬀerent techniques in
order to enhance resistance to traﬃc analysis. Yet, a majority of them share
one common assumption about the network: a topology consisting of point-to-
point links. This approach works nicely for the cable networks. However, when
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it comes to mobile security it fails miserably, due to the lack of point-to-point
links. Although the problem of resistance to traﬃc analysis has been around
for some time (e.g. [12,13]), only recently Matt Blaze et al. have managed to
formulate it for the wireless environment, see [14].
A majority of the schemes’ ﬁrst and often only line of defense is anonymity
(e.g. [7,15]). Although there is a whole continuum for degrees of anonymity
(see [16]), to simplify the model it is assumed that for a mobile agent it is
a binary value and that it can be lost only once (see [17]).
However, what is the situation when the anonymity is gone? In such
a situation, what remains to be protected is information accessed, collected
and analyzed by decision making systems. The way to handle traﬃc analysis
may be derived from drawing conclusions from real world cases.
2.2 Traﬃc Analysis in the Real World
This section serves the purpose of introducing traﬃc analysis in a wider con-
text, and to draw attention to a more general, strategic agenda. Also, it can
be nicely translated into a very precise language of game theory.
Passive observation seems to be as old as espionage itself, which claims
to be the second oldest profession. The case of traﬃc analysis for intelli-
gence agents was described in detail by Peter Wright in “Spycatcher: The
Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Oﬃcer” [18]. In the book he
describes how Russian agents were performing successful traﬃc analysis on
British counterintelligence services in London during the Cold War. There
are also accounts of the technical side of the story, traﬃc analysis depended
heavily on monitoring radio transmissions between counterintelligence oﬃcers.
The accounts given in the book concerned a multi-layer traﬃc analysis.
The ﬁrst-level traﬃc analysis provided information on what data was being
collected by the opponent. The second-level analysis employed strategy. When
data was gathered over a long period of time, it permitted the Soviets to draw
conclusions on what information had been acquired by counterintelligence.
This, together with the knowledge of their own operations, developed an ac-
curate picture about British secret services’ level of knowledge and strategy.
It also allowed for estimating what the other party does not know, to ﬁnd
a so-called knowledge complement. Such a reasoning seems at ﬁrst to be very
complicated, but it serves the ultimate goal “to attack the enemy’s strategy”.
Since we are mainly concerned with applications from the ﬁeld of economy,
it is time to get rid of espionage stories and provide a business-related example.
An excellent account of traﬃc analysis operation is given in “Wall Street”,
the movie directed by Oliver Stone (see [19]). Let us provide an outline of
the plot, since it is essential for further discussion. The story is based on the
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famous Ivan Boesky case in 80’, when a stock market tycoon was nailed by
SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) with charges of insider trading.
In the picture stock market tycoon Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas) sends
his young apprentice Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen) to observe Sir Larry Wildman
(Terrence Stamp). The later is a powerful British investor planning some
deal in the US. Gekko wants to learn about the deal. Following Sir Larry
Wildman for all the day Bud Fox ﬁnds what investment banks Brit was talking
to. He also found where the investor ﬂew his jet to after the talks. The
apprentice was unable to get any detail of conversations, since these were
carried out in secure locations. When Bud Fox came to report his master, he
was apologizing for the poor results. But for Gordon Gekko it was enough
information. Knowing the names of investment banks and people involved
he was sure that Sir Larry Wildman was interested in some heavy industry
enterprise. All these, combined with the Wildman’s plane destination (some
location in Pennsylvania) revealed his adversary the company itself—Anacott
Steel. Such a reasoning was possible, since Gordon Gekko knew well Sir Larry
Wildman. He combined his knowledge with all the information obtained by
the traﬃc analysis. As a result he derived and implemented strategy that
allowed him to make millions of dollars on the stocks market. It was not only
matter of insider trading or greenmail operation; it was demonstration of the
highest skills—a successful attack on the enemy’s strategy.
2.3 Traﬃc analysis, global market and mobile agents
In the old days traﬃc analysis in the reality was diﬀerent from that in data
security. There were some occasional interactions, mainly in the SIGNIT
(signal intelligence) ﬁeld. A good instance is a technical side of the story
described in “Spycatcher ...” [18]. In case of modern ﬁnancial markets it is
very diﬃcult to separate real world activities from cyberspace ones. In the
days before markets were interconnected the things were much simpler (e.g.
“Wall Street”). The core business activities and ﬁnancial market, although
closely related, were functionally separated.
Nowadays, all exchanges form one global market which never sleeps—there
always is some major exchange that trading is going on. The volume of “vir-
tual money” moving around a planet many times exceeds the global gross
product. Moreover, global markets are very volatile, so big money is made
and lost in a matter of seconds. The future of individual companies, indus-
tries and whole nations depends on what happens on the markets. In this
respect the cyberworld has a big impact on reality. With the development of
commodities markets and rapid growth in derivatives trading, everything can
be subject to some market valuation and consequently traded. This especially
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concerns the information, which on one side fuels the markets, while on the
other can be also a traded commodity (at least in some speciﬁc forms, like
intellectual property). So far, global markets are the most complex environ-
ment created by humans. Nobody fully understands all the interactions that
take place and there is nobody to control them. One of the best tools to
handle such a complexity is to use intelligent mobile agents for information
gathering and possibly trading. Out of these species, the most eﬃcient ones
are the agents with evolution driven intelligence, see [2]. Their main goal is
to collect information for their owner; their very survival depends on their
ability to do so. In such a framework the agent may have a personal interest
in making things happen. He will do anything to survive: he will evolve, ﬁnd
the shortest path through the network, lie to you or ﬁght his way with other
agents. Such a philosophy closely mirrors the real world.
3 Mobile Agents Traﬃc Analysis
In the previous chapter we described the state of the art in traﬃc analysis.
First, we discussed it in the context of cyberspace (data security). Next, we
recalled cases from the real world. As was stated earlier, we witness situations
where reality and cyberspace enter into a feedback. Joining both realms and
applying them to mobile agents will allow us to present the main contribution
of this paper. It is a good moment to recall our assumption on mobile agents
security: (1) protocols used are secure and (2) the agents outside trusted hosts
do not leak any other information than possibly about their presence.
Now we are ready to formulate the traﬃc analysis problem for mobile
agents. We focus on the speciﬁc situation when agents are used on a massive
scale, for instance to acquire information for decision making systems. In
the proposed framework, where large numbers of free roaming mobile agents
are employed in the complex network (possibly the whole Internet), traﬃc
analysis of the agents resembles a case for the wireless environment. Hence,
we advocate using an approach proposed by Matt Blaze et al. in [14].
3.1 The System and Threat Models
The owner of agents has a simple goal, to collect data without leaking in-
formation about itself. The owner, during the process, can encounter two
adversary types: listening adversary and active (e.g. Byzantine) adversary.
The adversary goals are more complex:
• Collecting the data on the opponent’s (owner) level of information;
• Collecting information on opponent’s knowledge complement (Section 2.2);
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• Collecting information of the opponent’s patterns of behavior and the reac-
tions to certain stimulus;
• Collecting information on the opponent’s strategy (ultimate goal).
At this point it is good to recall our assumptions for the security model:
• Agents can move freely between hosts;
• In public agents travel in encrypted form, the same applies to the data
acquired by the agent;
• Hosts are secure locations, which means that an adversary cannot compro-
mises a host’s security.
These assumptions mirror a real life situation, where agents can oper-
ate from the diplomatic post using diplomatic status as additional protection
(e.g. [18]). We have to make same assumptions as made by intelligence ser-
vices, that agents are under constant surveillance.
The mobile agents generate traﬃc in two ways, they can exchange data
with their owner and proliferate themselves through the network. Such a situ-
ation creates great opportunities for traﬃc analysis, since not only each of the
ways can be separately analyzed, but also their interactions can be investi-
gated. This would result in a multi-layer traﬃc analysis (see Section 2.2). To
illustrate this point consider a situation when only movements of the agents
are observed. Data can be collected by:
• Following the agents through the network;
• Tracing an agent’s route backwards;
• Observing some key nodes (e.g. database hosts).
As the result the volumes of data are collected from which activity patterns
can be extracted. In addition it is always good to have some extra information,
which can speed up the analysis. The case from “Wall Street” is a good
instance.
The proposed remedy follows from an analogy with the real world that the
best agents do not communicate with the masters. They act autonomously,
because information exchange is the most vulnerable element of any intelli-
gence operation (see [18]). Making use of this practice, we suggest that mobile
agents exchange information only in secure locations, ideally at the owner’s
own host.
3.2 Further Threats and Countermeasures
In the cyberworld an agent consists of bits, which can be freely copied. Al-
though protection techniques are available (see [22]), they have serious limi-
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tations. So, we consider a situation that agents can be captured. This can
be done simply by copying or replicating the agent, the process that neither
agent’s owner nor the agent himself be aware about. This is a major diﬀerence
with respect to the real world, where usually a master knows that an agent
was captured. In cyberworld it is left to the adversary to decide whether she
would disclose the fact of an agent’s capture (e.g. by making traceable use of
acquired information).
Once an adversary has the agent (or technically speaking the copy of the
agent), she can interrogate him. The main goal is to learn all information that
the agent possesses. However, sometimes it is more feasible to manipulate an
agent for one’s own advantage. In such a situation an agent can be used as
the medium to obtain more information from the agent’s master.
One protection can be the “need to know principle” used by all intelligence
services. It can be nicely illustrated by the old saying: “The less information
you have, the shorter is your interrogation time”. For mobile agents it can be
implemented within SPECNAZ framework as proposed in [2].
But this still might be insuﬃcient against more sophisticated attacks. For
instance, consider an adversary making use of a fake owner’s host, with full
corresponding environment. The game can be carried out much further, since
an agent may be fed with the data and released in order to mislead his owner.
Also the information that he provides might be correct, but aiming to provoke
some action. Because the problem is fuzzy, technical countermeasures are dif-
ﬁcult to design. One of the methods would be to use state appraisal functions
(see [22]), which make sure that agent’s data are not tampered with.
The general defense method should copy real life and use agent’s intelli-
gence. Intelligent mobile agents can be more diﬃcult to confuse, but they are
also more diﬃcult to control. If you are intelligent, you can lie in a convincing
way. Survival driven agents evaluate their situation in the context of their
own best interest, see [2]. This makes them eﬃcient, especially in the global
market context, but also increases certain risks (double agents, turning agents
and so on).
Knowing that agents are under constant surveillance, an owner may de-
velop countermeasures. For instance, various strategies can be employed to
increase the volume of traﬃc, with an artiﬁcial increase in random and non-
meaningful traﬃc (so-called “white noise”).
In the other example, agents drop information only at secure locations
and are not in regular contact with the owner. Usually, mobile agents gener-
ate traﬃc in two ways, they exchange data with their owner and proliferate
themselves through the network. This results in multi-layer traﬃc analysis
(Section 2.2). In the real world the best agents do not communicate with the
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owner. They act autonomously, because information exchange is the most
vulnerable element of any intelligence operation (e.g. [18]). Instead agents
should exchange information only in secure locations, ideally at the owner’s
own host.
Unfortunately, there is always a price to pay for the countermeasures
(see [20]). It comes either in system security or performance and accuracy. For
instance, a traﬃc volume big enough to prevent traﬃc analysis might be unfea-
sible in terms of other constraints (e.g. cost, bandwidth available). However,
a really serious threat follows the observation, that overdoing countermeasures
might enable side channel attacks.
3.3 Side Channel Attacks
A side channel attack (a.k.a covert channels interface) uses some secondary
data about the object investigated to deduce its main properties. An excel-
lent example is a whole class of attacks on the smartcards based on the power
analysis (e.g. [21]). In this case cryptographic functions performed by the
smartcard are not attacked directly (e.g. by breaking algorithms). The power
consumption of the device is measured and on this basis the statistical infor-
mation about “the patterns” in the smartcard operations are obtained. This
attack has recently proven to be quite successful, see [21].
Each side channel makes use of a diﬀerent measure of some patterns re-
sulting from the main activity of the systems under attack. Let us provide
a few possible side channels, for the agents’ mode of operation described:
• Time spent at the host by the agent;
• Power or resources used by the agent;
• Changes in the visible agent’s characteristics (e.g. the size of the traveling
agent);
• Host communication with the agent’s owner, for instance billing for the
information used;
• Way that agent was hosted (priorities, status, security level, etc.). For
instance in the case described in Section 2.2 the only intelligence services
communications were encrypted, while all other (e.g. police, ﬁre services)
were in plain text, which allowed to separate them from the data stream.
It is interesting to note that almost all the attacks result from the coun-
termeasures described in the previous section. The side channels are used to
make the countermeasures transparent, like they were never in place. It can
be shown that many of the above outlined attack opportunities originate from
the countermeasures against traﬃc analysis. This leads to the paradox that
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a side channel attack may result from the excessive use of countermeasures.
For instance, when smartcards with build-in countermeasures against power
analysis attacks were tested for electro-magnetic emission (e.g. [21]), it was
found that they leak a lot of information. In our case consider owners requir-
ing agents to drop information at secure locations. It forces mobile agents to
carry all collected information with them. As the agent acquires data, his size
will change. Although all information is encrypted, it will provide data that
the host database was used. In practice it is very diﬃcult to anticipate in ad-
vance all possible side channels. This would require complete knowledge of all
the system parameters in every state of operation. Such a requirement can be
easily brought to a much more philosophical question: will our understanding
of Nature ever be complete?
In summary; in order to protect oneself against traﬃc analysis one needs
to avoid any “patterns”. The type of sideline pattern can be very diﬃcult to
predict in advance. Hence, the owner has to “submerge” the activity (e.g. in-
formation requested) into the ocean of statistically non-distinguishable activ-
ities, for instance see [15]. Still, there is no guarantee that some unexpected
attack resulting from a newly found sideline would not appear. The more
countermeasures against traﬃc analysis are used, the greater the chance for
more side channels. The lesson learned is that an increasing supply of privacy
may beneﬁt the attacker and hence be counterproductive.
4 Conclusions
We discussed mobile agents resistance to traﬃc analysis. We focused on mo-
bile code used on a massive scale in decision making systems, with a special
emphasis on trading on ﬁnancial markets. In this context we discussed the
interplay between two overlapping realms of cyberspace and real world. As
the result, we could present the implication of these interactions on mobile
agents and their owner. It became clear that such a perspective, allows to
describe previously unseen complications in the system design and analysis.
For instance, many side channels might appear and they are very diﬃcult to
control. This led us to a paradox of overprotection, when introducing more
security into the system makes it more vulnerable for side channel attacks. As
it was stated at the very beginning of this paper building a good mathemati-
cal model for the described problems is a challenging task. It seems that such
a model should make use of methods from various branches of mathematics,
for instance:
• Mathematical methods of AI, e.g. using fuzzy sets/logic to build traﬃc
analysis expert systems;
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• Abstract algebra, e.g. modeling agents’s and environment properties as op-
erations within an algebraic structure;
• Game theory, e.g. see approach proposed by S. Bistarelli et al. in [3], also
consult his paper in the same ENTCS volume;
• Graph theory methods (see [23]), e.g.: movement graphs/networks, graph
knowledge presentation, graph grammars.
We think that an “overprotection paradox” can be generalized to all sys-
tems with a complexity exceeding a certain threshold. Claiming that adding
more protection mechanisms to the system actually weakens it, seems to be
very counterintuitive. The research community has so far largely considered
building security as the graduate process of introducing more and more secure
components that protect against diﬀerent threats. However, as we demon-
strated above such a perception can be false. The key issue is the interaction
between various parts of a complex system, with many hidden couplings, which
were not foreseen by the designers. When the system operations span diﬀerent
realms such interactions become extremely complicated and intractable. In
such a situation, instead of adding more complexity, we would rather advocate
applying the KISS principle. While there is more then one way to read this
acronym, we recommend Keep It Simple and Safe.
We hope that in this short paper, we were able to sketch the problem in
the way, which makes it an interesting topic for further investigations.
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